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Abstract 
The paper passes in review the post-war steps to a parliamentary European Union and a party-
political European Union and concludes that these are irreversible. It further considers the 
Spitzenkandidaten/Lead Candidate procedure, first used in 2014, and assumes, more debatably 
perhaps, that it, too, is probably irreversible. The paper acknowledges six ‘known unknowns’ 
that could have considerable consequences for the evolution of the Union’s party-political 
system. The paper then considers some basic questions about the model the Union has 
cumulatively chosen before considering some of the ‘discontents’ of some party-political 
systems and their potential relevance to the EU’s emerging system. The paper briefly considers 
whether the early evolution of the US party political system can shed any light on possible 
developments and identifies similarities. It concludes by pointing out that the existence of a 
parliamentary party-political system, with electoral linkage between the executive and the 
legislature, is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for viable governance – and 
opposition.   
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Introduction: ‘a system appropriate to a continent’  
In 1979, the British political philosopher and commentator David Marquand wrote a forward-
looking analysis of the European Parliament on the eve of the first direct elections. Towards 
the end of his analysis, Marquand speculated about a ‘Party Europe’ and predicted that, 
ultimately, a nationalist-supra-nationalist system would evolve. This evolution would not be 
quick or tidy and would probably overlap ‘in a puzzling and superficially illogical way’ with 
the existing left-right system. However, what was under discussion was “the possible 
emergence of a system appropriate to a continent” (Marquand, 1979, p. 125, my emphasis). 
The aim of this paper is to engage in a ‘thought experiment’ by considering the possible ways 
in which the European Union’s emerging party-political system might evolve in the longer term 
and the possible ramifications of such developments. What might a system appropriate for the 
European continent look like? The ‘experiment’ is based on three assumptions. The first is that 
the EU is irreversibly set on being a parliamentary Union. The second is that the EU is 
irreversibly set on being a party-political Union. The third, perhaps more debateable, is that the 
Spitzenkandidaten/lead candidate procedure is here to stay.  
 
1. Irreversible steps towards a parliamentary European Union 
In its post-war incarnation, European federalism always envisaged the establishment of a 
parliamentary pillar. It was a vision pushed particularly by British federalists such as William 
Beveridge, based on the United Kingdom’s strong parliamentary tradition. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (1948) was the first to emerge from that vision. Thus:  
Parliamentarians for the first time participated in (the external representation) of the 
State. Parliamentary action began to replace diplomatic action. This gradually changed 
relations in Europe from a character of foreign policy to a character of home policy, 
from international law to constitutional law (Posselt, 1992, p. 187).  
With the creation of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(1952) and the European Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community 
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(1957), several further significant steps were taken. In the first place, the Assembly (precursor 
of the European Parliament, of course) was granted the draconian power of being able to dismiss 
the European Commission. In the second place, it was granted the right to draft and adopt its 
own rules of procedure – a power that would come into its own after 1979. In the third place, it 
was largely deprived of any other power, being limited to a weak consultative role in the 
budgetary and legislative spheres:  
The result was that the European Community system contained a Parliament which, 
unlike most national Parliaments, did not regard itself as part of a finished institutional 
system, but as part of one requiring evolution or even transformation into something 
different, seeking to turn the Community from a largely intergovernmental system to 
one based more on parliamentary principles (Corbett, 1999, p. 90). 
This vocation to promote constitutional change rapidly became ingrained, with the 
Parliament becoming an instinctively federalist body. Nowhere was that federalist fervour more 
intense than on the issue of direct elections. The process that led ultimately to the first direct 
elections in 1979 has been well-described (for example Scalingi, 1980; Westlake, 1994; Costa, 
2001; Bardi and Ignazi, 2004; Judge and Earnshaw, 2003; Corbett and Jacobs, 2016); key dates 
include: the 9-10 December 1974 Paris summit, where the principle of direct elections was 
agreed; the 1-2 December 1975 Rome summit, where a single date for the forthcoming elections 
was first identified; the 12 July 1976 agreement on size and seats; the 20 September 1976 
Convention; and, ultimately, the 7-10 June 1979 first direct elections to the European 
Parliament themselves. Meanwhile, the 1970 and 1975 budget treaties created what was 
tantamount to a bicameral budgetary authority. The 1975 treaty, in particular, foresaw a 
conciliation procedure between the Council and the Parliament and granted the latter the power 
to reject the draft budget.  
The 1979 elections triggered over thirty years of ‘catching-up’, as the now directly-
elected Parliament sought to play the role that had been denied it in 1957. Indeed, since 1979 
the Parliament, with its new-found autonomy and electoral legitimacy, has evolved into the 
veritable twin arm of the Union’s budgetary and legislative authorities through the following: 
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astute use of its rules of procedure; building on precedent; the occasional complicity of the other 
institutions (particularly the European Commission) and the member states; Court battles and 
rulings; inter-institutional agreements; sheer persistence and consistent constitutional vision; 
and, above all, through frequent Treaty change,. How rapidly that evolution occurred is well 
illustrated by the observations of two experts, writing less than ten years apart.  
Writing in 1999, Pinder argued that, in the then-Community ‘pillar’ of the Maastricht 
Treaty, this process towards a parliamentary Union was far advanced. The main reform 
challenge concerned the Council, retaining  
A role, executive as well as legislative, that is more predominant than is, for such an 
indirectly elected body, compatible with the principles of representative government 
[but] the main changes that would bring the institutions of the Community into line with 
those principles are reformist rather than revolutionary: completion of the Parliament’s 
right of co-decision with the Council; generalisation of the majority voting procedure 
and open legislative sessions in the Council; fuller executive competences for the 
Commission and a more normal accountability to the legislature (Pinder, 1999, p. 124). 
 
With regard to the other two pillars, on the other hand, “the process of combining the adoption 
of common instruments with the enhancement of democratic elements in the institutions has 
scarcely begun” (Ibid., pp. 124-125). Pinder foresaw a gradual transition from a ‘pre-democratic 
Union’ to a ‘democratic federal Union’. 
Writing less than ten years later in 2008, Priestley was to describe how:  
The Long March of the European Parliament to a form of institutional maturity is more 
or less at an end.1 The Lisbon Treaty has filled in most of the gaps, ironed out some of 
the inconsistencies and completed the main foundations of what is the parliamentary 
dimension of Europe’s construction. The European Parliament today meets the main 
classic conditions of what would be expected of a parliamentary body: it will decide on 
legislation (with the governments of the member states); it will determine, again with 
the governments, both the annual budget and the multi-annual financial framework; it 
appoints and controls the Executive, while operating in a system of separation of powers 
(Priestley, 2008, p. 203)2. 
                                                          
1 Less, Andrew Duff (tax raising and assent to treaty changes) and Francis Jacobs (appointment of judges) would 
argue. (6 August 2017 correspondence with Francis Jacobs and 10 August 2017 correspondence with Andrew 
Duff). 
2 In 2019, Parliament will be exercising another novel power – that of consenting to the UK’s exit deal.  
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The ninth set of direct elections to the European Parliament will be held in May/June 
2019. It can surely be asserted with absolute certainty that direct elections to the European 
Parliament are here to stay. And while an occasional minor reverse might occur,3 it can surely 
be asserted with a similar degree of certainty that the powers the Parliament has accrued will 
not be reversed. For better or worse (and most democrats would unhesitatingly declare that it is 
for the better), the European Union has adopted an increasingly strong parliamentary 
dimension, not only as an integral and important part of its overall policy-making and legislative 
machinery but as a vital facet of its democratic identity. This is asserted robustly in Article 10 
of the Treaty on European Union, which declares that “The functioning of the Union shall be 
founded on representative democracy” (10.1) and that “Citizens are directly represented at 
Union level in the European Parliament” (10.2). Thus, since 1952, the European Union has 
inexorably evolved towards being a parliamentary Union, and it must be assumed that this trend 
is irreversible.  
 
2. Irreversible steps towards a party-political European Union 
Although pan-European parliamentary institutions have existed for over six decades: “The 
development of transnational structures encompassing members of like-minded national 
political parties has proved to be a relatively slow and tentative process” (Teasdale and 
Bainbridge, 2012, p. 405). Christian Democracy was initially as much an international as a 
purely European force (Papini, 1997), although it soon came to play a predominant role in the 
European integration process (Kalyvas, 1996; Kaiser, 2007) and was by far the most advanced 
                                                          
3 A rare example of such a reverse concerned Parliament’s assent powers. As initially provided for under the Single 
European Act, an absolute majority was required for assent to be granted. This meant that the simple absence of 
such a majority could be used to delay and the Parliament wasn’t slow to understand and exploit this unintended 
(or certainly unforeseen) nuance. The Maastricht Treaty’s draftsmen quietly did away with the absolute majority 
requirement and thus weakened Parliament’s powers. In the US Senate, by contrast, a two-thirds majority is 
required before the President can ratify any treaty. (See Westlake, 1994, 158 and Westlake, 1998, 26-27.) I am 
grateful to Richard Corbett for pointing to another rare example, in the domain of the Parliament’s budgetary 
powers; under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP can no longer increase spending in any field without Council’s agreement. 
(26 June 2017 correspondence with the author) 
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in establishing coordination mechanisms that would ultimately evolve into a party structure 
(Jansen, 2006, Fontaine, 2009). Initially more ambivalent about the European integration 
process, Socialist parties took longer to create similar coordination mechanisms (Lightfoot, 
2005); the Liberals and associated parties took until the mid-1970s (Watson, 2010, 2015; 
Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012, p. 405). None of these were yet recognisably parties (no direct 
membership or common manifesto, for example), but in institutional terms their representatives 
had consistently behaved in a particular fashion from the 1950s onwards; from its inception, 
the members of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community sat 
according to political affiliation rather than nationality, “a practice unhesitatingly taken over by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC and Euratom Treaties and, in 1979, by the first directly-
elected European Parliament” (Westlake, 1994, p. 11). It was those first direct elections that 
acted as a catharsis, both directly and indirectly. Directly, parties from the same political 
families now fought on a trans-European battlefield, though they shrank back to the political 
groups within the Parliament once the election campaigns were over. Indirectly, for as the 
momentum for reform and further integration grew, the potential federalising role of such 
European political parties was increasingly appreciated. As a prescient David Marquand had 
put it in 1979: 
The Community’s chances of moving beyond the narrow limits of the present Europe 
des patries depend crucially on the emergence of a Europe des partis, in which the 
political forces that matter at the national level are bound together by the need to fight 
for power at the Community level (1978, p. 124).  
The coordination role of these emerging European political parties grew, particularly before 
European Council meetings, but the key would always be resources and, primarily, funding.  
The breakthrough came with the Maastricht Treaty (1993). A new article (Article 138a) 
stated that “Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within 
the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political 
will of the citizens of the Union”.  
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It was the Maastricht Treaty that also enshrined the concept of the European citizen. As in many 
other areas, once the principle (of parties at European level) had been granted, further 
constitutional reforms consolidated and enhanced the concept. Thus, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997) paved the way for European political parties to be paid for out of the European budget, 
and the parties accordingly started to spend money. The Treaty of Nice (2001) provided that 
the Council and the Parliament should jointly lay down the regulations governing European 
political parties and particularly their funding. A subsequent Regulation (2003) defined what 
European political parties were and made it clear that funding had to remain at the level of the 
European political parties – that is, it couldn’t be siphoned back to domestic political parties. 
This provision encouraged the European-level parties to organise themselves better. The 2003 
Regulation was modified several times by Parliament Bureau decisions and amended in 2007 
so as to enable the emerging parties to establish corresponding political parties at European 
level. The 2007 regulation also granted the European political parties exclusive responsibility 
to campaign for the European elections (the regulation forbade the corresponding political 
groups of the European Parliament from campaigning). A further Regulation (2014) updated 
and refined the 2007 Regulation’s provisions, granting European Political Parties and 
Foundations legal status and establishing an Authority, a body of the European Union, for the 
purpose of registering, controlling and sanctioning European political parties and foundations. 
The Authority came into being on 1 January 2017.  
These developments did not always go smoothly (see Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012, 
pp. 405-409 for a fuller account), but there was always only one direction of travel. This 
concentration on the technical side of developments should not distract from the political and 
ideological manoeuvres that accompanied the several waves of enlargement that occurred from 
1985 onwards. Indeed, there have been several fascinating accounts of how the European 
political parties were built up (see, for example, Martens, 2008 and Watson, 2010; for a more 
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strategic and tactical view, see Welle, 1997). Nevertheless, it was these technical developments 
that facilitated the political construction work. Although I have elsewhere argued that the 
draftsmen of the Lisbon Treaty generated (notably through Title II of the Treaty on European 
Union) a vision of a composite democracy, embodying elements of representative, participatory 
and direct democracy (Westlake, 2016, p. xiii), the vision of a party-based democracy (both the 
European Parliament and national parliaments) is clearly pre-eminent (TEU, Article 10.4).  
This whistle-stop review of developments since 1979 has shown how far and how fast 
the Union has come with regard to the concept of European political parties. As with the concept 
of a parliamentary Union, it is instructive to compare what commentators observed twenty years 
ago with the situation today. In the first edition of their seminal study, Political Parties in the 
European Union, Simon Hix and Christopher Lord considered specifically whether the EU was 
a “party democracy” (1998, p. 204). Their conclusion was that “some progress” had been made 
towards a “Europe of parties” (p. 213), but they identified a number of weaknesses – the gravest 
being the lack of electoral legitimacy – and proposed a number of reforms. Many of the latter 
have since been implemented, including, as was seen above, the creation of party foundations 
and, as will be seen below, the creation of a direct link between European elections and the 
presidency of the European Commission.4 Only a uniform electoral procedure has so far yet to 
materialise, though one may well result from the work that the Parliament’s Constitutional 
Affairs Committee has recently embarked upon. In conclusion, significant steps have been 
taken towards a Europe des partis; momentum has grown and developments have accelerated. 
If Priestley could still declare in 2010 that European political parties were the “missing link” 
                                                          
4 Although there is scope for research about the extent of the possibility of direct membership of European parties. 
I am grateful to Sir Graham Watson and Francis Jacobs for making this point. As Watson points out, “ALDE 
introduced it under my leadership and I believe the S&D had something similar. In ALDE’s case there are now 
over 5000 individual members, not all of them members of ALDE parties at national level. They are given 
delegates’ and voting rights and some rights in policy formation at meetings of Council and Congress” (7 June 
2017 correspondence with the author). 
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(2010),5 nevertheless, particularly since 1979, and even more so since 1983, the Union has 
inexorably evolved towards becoming a party-political Union and it must be assumed that the 
trend is irreversible (what those future parties might be is another matter).  
 
3. The Spitzenkandidaten/Lead Candidate Procedure: an irreversible steps towards…? 
Space precludes a detailed consideration of the origins and development of the 
Spitzenkandidaten/lead candidate concept and procedure, from the EPP’s 2002 congress in 
Estoril onwards – or perhaps even before (see Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2000 4th edition; 
Hobolt, 2014; Shackleton, 2014; Christiansen, 2015; Penalver and Priestley, 2015; Westlake, 
2016a, for such accounts). The EPP maintained that the procedure had first been used in 2004, 
in anticipation of the draft Constitutional Treaty’s provisions, and again in 2009, in anticipation 
of the Lisbon Treaty’s similar provisions. On both occasions, the EPP won a greater number of 
MEPs than the S&D, and José Manuel Barroso, as a Christian Democrat, was therefore 
considered to be the candidate of the winning party and, indeed, was presented as such in the 
EPP’s literature (Westlake, 2016, pp. 34-35). The use of the procedure before, during and after 
the May 2014 European elections nevertheless represented a significant development for three 
reasons, all related to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The first is the wording of 
Article 17.7 of the Treaty on European Union:  
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the 
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall 
propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. 
 
Thus, an explicit and direct electoral link had been established.  
The second is the provisions of Declaration 11 that was appended to the Treaty on 
European Union:  
Prior to the decision of the European Council, representatives of the European 
Parliament and of the European Council will thus conduct the necessary consultations 
                                                          
5 And Fabbrini could write that “The transnational party organizations are more rhetorical than effective 
organizations” (2007, pp. 137-138). 
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in the framework deemed the most appropriate. These consultations will focus on the 
backgrounds of the candidates for President of the Commission, taking account of the 
elections to the European Parliament… 
These ‘consultations’ are clearly intended to smooth the process of designation and 
make it absolutely clear that the European Council cannot decide unilaterally (as was previously 
the case), and again the electoral link is asserted plainly. The third development is the next 
sentence of Article 17.7: “This candidate shall be elected by a majority of its component 
members”. The operative word here is ‘elected’ – not ‘approved’ or ‘confirmed’. The article 
thus provides an additional electoral linkage to a majority – an absolute majority – in 
Parliament.  
The first experience with the Spitzenkandidaten/lead candidate procedure in 2014 
generated considerable academic and public interest. It was portrayed in the media in particular 
as a means of raising public awareness and hence of increasing electoral participation. When 
turnout in the May 2014 European elections remained stubbornly similar to the turnout at the 
previous European elections in 2009, this was seen, inevitably, as a failure. But those who 
fought for the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty to be fully implemented were not just concerned 
about increasing turnout – though electoral legitimacy was important to them (see, for example, 
Van Parijs, 2015). Rather, they saw the implementation of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure as 
a deliberate choice of direction for the future democratic development of the European Union, 
seeking to establish not only an electoral linkage between the European elections and the 
presidency of the European Commission but a political linkage between a supporting majority 
in Parliament and the Commission President’s political programme – tying in the executive to 
the legislative, in other words.  Supporters of the procedure were not unduly disappointed by 
the turnout figures – they knew that the first time around would be problematic. For them, what 
mattered was the precedent, and the creation of expectations that the procedure would be 
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repeated, in such a way that it would become an established part of the institutional scenery.6 
As one high-ranking official of the Parliament put it:  
The members of the European Council believed it wouldn’t happen. Therefore, they 
were unprepared. For as long as it happens only once, they can regard it as an accident. 
But if it happens again, then it becomes a practice. The (European) Council is a practice-
based institution... Therefore, the crucial battle will be next time (Interview with the 
author).  
The working assumption of this paper is that that envisaged crucial battle will be won 
in 2019, and that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure will occur again, and again in 2024, and so 
on, and thus becomes established practice in all succeeding European elections.7 It would then, 
as the anonymous analyst suggested, become a practice and not simply a one-off accident. If 
the lead candidate procedure occurs again following the European elections in 2019, then the 
European Union will have made a decisive step beyond a governance system with strong 
parliamentary and party-political dimensions towards a system that could be described as a 
nascent party political parliamentary democracy, with an executive function relying on a 
parliamentary majority. To the supporters of the procedure, it will have introduced an important 
element of legitimacy:  
By doing this and by giving the citizens not only the choice on composition of the 
European Parliament but also the choice on who is running the Executive - the European 
Commission - the new process is dramatically increasing the legitimacy of the system 
(Welle, 2015b). 
If this assumption proves to be justified, then the European Union, it may safely be said, 
will have definitively answered the question posed by the 15 December 2001 Laeken 
Declaration on the future of the European Union8 (Bulletin of the European Union, 2001), will 
have turned its back definitively on the idea of a directly-elected President (as in the United 
                                                          
6 A strong corollary is, as Simon Hix has convincingly argued, that: ‘“European” public opinion – a European 
‘demos’? – will not exist until there is a genuine European-wide battle for political power at the EU level. The 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure is the start of this: (11 July 2017 correspondence with the author). See also Hix, 2008. 
7 It is possible that the battle might be lost although, with the imminent departure of the United Kingdom, which 
was ultimately the chief opponent of the procedure in 2014, the probability of success has surely been enhanced. 
8 ‘How can the authority and efficiency of the European Commission be enhanced? How should the President of 
the Commission be appointed: by the European Council, by the European Parliament or should he be directly-
elected by the citizens?’  
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States or France) and thus also on the presidential model even if, confusingly, the leader of the 
European Commission will still be called ‘President’. Equally, the Union will have definitively 
turned its course towards some form – no matter how hybrid – of parliamentary government, 
characterised by, variously, a collegial government, reliant on the confidence of the legislature, 
with the possibility of dismissal by the legislature, and selected/elected by the legislature (see 
Lijphart, 1992, pp. 1-27, for a comparative analysis of the two basic models). As Welle has put 
it:  
If the Commission is now based on a parliamentary majority, then we may have what 
we call traditionally 'parliamentary democracy' in the European Union. That is not a 
small thing. That is not a small thing at all. So, it may well be that with this new 
Commission based on a parliamentary majority we are just starting the transition 
towards parliamentary democracy in the European Union (Welle, 2014). 
 
4. ‘Known unknowns’ 
This paper engages in some speculation about possible developments in the evolution of 
European Union political parties and party systems, but to keep the ‘experiment’ relatively 
simple, no attempt is made to take into account six sets of probable or possible future 
developments. As such, these developments are ‘known unknowns’, flagged up here but not 
considered further because they would add too much complexity to an already complex 
exercise.  
The first ‘known unknown’ concerns the future geographical dimensions of the 
European Union. Even if the current Juncker Commission has frozen the possibility of 
accession during its mandate (and ruled out the possibility of Turkey acceding), the longer-term 
perspective taken by this paper implies strongly that further accessions to the EU will have 
taken place, particularly from among the current candidate countries (Albania, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey) and those waiting in the wings 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo). In the case of each of those countries, political parties and 
party-political systems have evolved, and will continue to evolve in distinctive and 
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idiosyncratic fashion, and they would bring their own specific identities into the Union. It is 
impossible to speculate about the effects such parties and systems might have, though the 
prevalence of nationalisms and regional concerns suggest that such accessions would have 
some, if not considerable, impact. 
The second concerns the structure and institutional arrangements of the European Union 
in general. An Intergovernmental Conference might seem highly unlikely in the immediately 
foreseeable future, but what about in twenty or thirty years’ time?9 For the time being, the Union 
may prefer to find alternative ways of re-ordering its affairs – perhaps through hybrid extra-
treaty arrangements in some cases (defence, for example) – but in the longer run, amendments 
to the Treaties will surely be necessary (some Treaty amendments may well already be 
necessary to deal with Brexit). Again, it is difficult to speculate about exactly what those might 
be and how they might impact on the evolution of a future Union parliamentary party-political 
system. 
The third ‘known unknown’ more specifically concerns governance of the eurozone. 
Consolidation of the eurozone, whether along the lines initially set out in the ‘Five Presidents’ 
Report’ (Juncker et al, 2015) or the European Commission’s follow-up Reflection Paper on the 
Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (European Commission, 2017b) or according 
to the visions set out in President Emanuel Macron’s 26 September 2017 Sorbonne speech (and 
for which he has a specific electoral mandate – Münchau, 2017) or possibly in some other way 
is a political and economic imperative that all have recognised (including, it should be noted, 
the 2015-2017 British government and its predecessor). The draft February 2016 Settlement for 
the United Kingdom within the European Union (European Council, 2016), if it had been 
implemented, would have enabled such consolidation to go ahead. Through its March 2017 
                                                          
9 Though Angela Merkel did not rule out such a possibility in her 15 May 2017 summit meeting with new French 
President Emmanuel Macron, Andrew Duff believes that “the next IGC, and hopefully Convention, will take place 
before 2024 – not least to tackle eurozone governance, adjust post-Brexit, tackle immigration competence and 
electoral reform and seat apportionment” (10 August 2017 correspondence with the author). See also Duff, 2015c. 
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White Paper on the Future of Europe, the European Commission has effectively launched a 
reflection process about whether other means can be found to achieve the same aims, 
particularly for scenarios 4 – doing less more efficiently – and 5 – doing much more together 
(European Commission, 2017a). In its follow-up Reflection Paper, the European Commission 
considers how a strengthened EMU architecture can be anchored in terms of democratic 
accountability. It considers equipping the European and national parliaments with “sufficient 
powers” of oversight (p. 27) but rightly ventures no further in considering whether a specific 
configuration of the European Parliament might be appropriate. Chang and Hodson (2017), on 
the other hand, suggest that a dedicated Sub-Committee of the European Parliament with 
appropriate membership might be the best structural response. With or without such reforms, 
calls for democratisation of the eurozone have been increasing (see, e.g., Piketty, 2017; Henette 
et al, 2017 and Magnette, 2017).  
It is simply too early to be able to know how such consolidation and democratisation 
will take place and in what way, although the creation of some sort of ‘core’ eurozone with 
some sort of parliamentary arrangement would have consequences for the way in which 
European Union political parties evolve – in terms both of substance and structure. The point 
could be made more broadly with regard to any differentiated architecture, which is surely one 
of the reasons why, in his 2017 State of the European Union address to the European Parliament, 
Jean-Claude Juncker robustly rejected the idea in declaring, “The Parliament of the euro area 
is the European Parliament” (Juncker, 2017, p. 16).10 
A fourth ‘known unknown’ concerns the evolution of the European Council and of the 
Council of Ministers. Space precludes a substantive treatment of this issue, but questions would 
                                                          
10 On the other hand, as Sir Graham Watson has pointed out, “Political parties can deal with differentiated 
architecture. For example, the ALDE Party had a debate (at a Council meeting in 2013) about whether congress 
delegates from non-EU member states should have the right to vote in elections to choose the ALDE 
Spitzenkandidat. We decided they should, for 2014, but I can see this question being posed again in the future” (7 
June 2017 correspondence with the author). 
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include the consequences of a consolidated Spitzenkandidaten procedure for the competences 
of the Commission and the European Council: would it force ‘purity’ on them both? Would the 
Commission have to shed its ‘neutral’ functions (competition, anti-fraud,11 etc) and become 
‘only’ an executive? Would the European Council/Council have to shed its executive functions? 
What sort of relationship might evolve with the Council and the European Council, and how 
might those two bodies evolve in the same context? And what if, as Jean-Claude Juncker 
recently proposed in his State of the European Union address, the two Presidencies would 
somehow be combined (Juncker, 2017, p. 18)? And how, in any case, would an emerging party-
political system cope with the unsynchronised electoral systems of the member states?  
The fifth ‘known unknown’ concerns the specific case of the future of the seventy-three 
seats in the European Parliament that will be freed up as of 2019 if the United Kingdom exits 
the European Union as foreseen. More particularly, a number of actors have called for the seats 
to be reallocated to create a pan-European Union constituency (De La Baume, 2017; Kalcik 
and Wolff, 2017), echoing, notably, the recommendations set out in then MEP Andrew Duff’s 
2011 report to the European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee (Duff, 2011; see 
also Duff, 2015b).12 Again, the new French President, Emmanuel Macron, incorporated such 
an idea in his presidential programme (Macron, 2017). Duff’s basic idea, though it would 
require Treaty change, would create a “joint constituency” to elect the European Commission 
president, with lists headed by each political party’s candidate. Macron’s more simple idea 
(though it would still require Treaty change), shared by many (including former MEP Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, for example), is simply to create a trans-national, trans-European list of 73 seats, 
a possibility recently endorsed by Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2017 State of the European Union 
                                                          
11 The creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office would to some extent achieve this already. 
12 Although the concept of some sort of European political constituency is as old as the directly-elected European 
Parliament itself, if not older. I am grateful to Francis Jacobs for pointing this out. 
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address.13 It is impossible to predict how this issue might turn out (though, since Treaty change 
would be required, it would seem a safe bet to assume that nothing, even if decided, would be 
implemented by 2019). 
The sixth, related, ‘known unknown’ concerns whether, and how, the European 
Parliament might finally react to the German Constitutional Court’s June 2009 ruling regarding 
the legality of the Lisbon Treaty and, in particular, the criticisms made about the legitimacy of 
the Parliament, given that its members are not elected by a uniform system, and given also that 
the number of MEPs per member state is apportioned through the principle of degressive 
proportionality (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009) – a principle enshrined in TEU Article 14.2. 
As Duff describes:  
If each MEP does not have an equal vote, is each citizen equally represented at the 
European Union level, as the Treaty requires? The Court points out that the change 
made by the Lisbon treaty to the mandate of MEPs – becoming ‘representatives of the 
Union’s citizens’ rather than, as previously, ‘representatives of the peoples of the States’ 
– is flatly contradicted by the fact that seats are still apportioned entirely per member 
state. Moreover, the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not believe that the vague 
federalist concept of degressive proportionality amounts to a serious method of 
distributing seats. In the Court’s view, in spite of the Union’s pretensions to European 
citizenship, the European Parliament is in fact made up of national contingents. (Duff, 
2015b, see also Westlake, 2016, pp. 41-42)14 
Decisions about the composition of the European Parliament and about the allocation of 
seats between member states are notoriously difficult. According to Art. 14.2 of the Treaty on 
the European Union, the composition of the Parliament is adopted through a special legislative 
procedure, whereby a European Council decision is taken upon an initiative of the European 
Parliament and requires its consent (by simple majority). Andrew Duff has cogently argued that 
the only “intelligent approach” in the longer run would be the so-called “CamCom” method of 
apportionment (see Duff, 2015a, pp. 105-107 for a succinct presentation of this methodology). 
What is clear, in any case, is that the European Council decision concerning the composition of 
                                                          
13 Although, as Geoffrey Harris points out, in the longer run, ”the assumption that a special EU-wide list for the 
73 ex-UK seats would mostly go to federalists is a risky one” (4 July 2017 correspondence with the author). 
14 On the other hand, if the Spitzenkandidaten procedure is consolidated in 2019, then the Court’s argument about 
the non-justification for a threshold will surely be weakened because of the consolidated linkage to the executive. 
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the current (2014-2019 Parliament) is about to be reviewed – a revision foreseen before the 
2016 referendum result in the United Kingdom:  
This decision will be revised again before the 2019-2024 parliamentary term upon an 
initiative of the European Parliament to be presented before the end of 2016. The aim 
will be to establish a system which will in the future make it possible, before each new 
election to the European parliament, to allocate seats between member states in a fair, 
objective and transparent manner, taking into account any potential change in the 
number, as well as any demographic trends, in the respective populations of member 
states (European Council, 2013). 
At the time of writing (September 2017), the European Parliament’s Constitutional 
Affairs Committee is deliberating a draft report and resolution (the co-rapporteurs are the 
Committee Chair, Danuta Hübner (EPP), and the Committee’s Vice-Chair, Pedro Silva Pereira 
(S&D)), Parliament’s work having been badly delayed by the Brexit process--the Committee 
was authorised to begin work on the substance of the file only after the UK lodged its 
notification under Article 50 TEU. The current draft report adopts a pragmatic approach in 
proposing a reduction Parliament’s membership to 700, a redistribution to ensure greater 
proportionality, and a ‘reserve’ of 51 seats for possible future enlargements and/or a joint 
constituency. The draft report argues that the latter issue, however, should be dealt with in the 
context of the European electoral law (Hübner and Silva Pereira, 2017). 
 
5. Some basic questions 
As has been seen, the European integration process opted, by default, to adopt a parliamentary 
model. The parliamentary system of government, increasingly wedded to universal suffrage, 
had only really come into its own after the First World War but would have seemed the obvious 
choice in the immediate post-war period. It is generally compared favourably with presidential 
systems of government. In it, the absence of the purist separation of powers in presidential 
systems is counter-balanced by a diffusion of powers and easier and more rapid passing of 
legislation. But will the parliamentary system of government still be considered favourably 
twenty or thirty years hence? In many countries parliaments are currently regarded critically; 
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various corruption cases involving individual parliamentarians have added to the critical mix.  
Is the parliamentary model an enduring one, and will it still seem appropriate by, say, 2059?  
And what, in the same context, of political parties? Funding scandals in various Western 
systems have undermined the legitimacy of many mainstream, well-established political 
parties. But beyond the peccadilloes of individual parties and their office holders, there would 
also appear to be more systemic problems concerning the way in which modern political parties, 
no longer benefitting from mass membership and reliant on public funding, leading to 
dependent bureaucratic structures (see Mair, 2013, for a trenchant, and sustained, critique of 
the ‘hollowing out’ of democracy), have somehow smothered the very political dialogue that 
they are supposed to foster and facilitate (see Nothomb, 2017, for a recent outburst).  
What, moreover, of party government as a system? Already in the 1980s – soon after 
the first direct elections to the European Parliament had been held, scholars were beginning to 
question the merits and the potential of party government, especially given the decline of some 
of the phenomena on which it had been predicated, such as mass party membership, strong 
party loyalty, low volatility in voting patterns, and strong class identification (Castles and 
Wildenmann, 1986; Wildenmann, 1986). Are parties truly fulfilling an aggregation function, 
and are they still able to provide a stable basis for government whilst also ensuring democratic 
legitimacy? The sudden rise of non-parties and movements and the collapse of support for 
traditional parties, as has occurred most recently in the 2017 French presidential elections but 
as has also occurred in Italy and Greece, suggest that they may not – or not automatically, in 
any case.  
And what of the mainstream party families that currently exist at the Union level? In 
1967, Lipset and Rokkan, grandfathers of post-war political science, observed that “the party 
systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 
1920s” (1967, p. 50). Their conclusion was:  
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The dominant electoral alternatives then prevalent in Western Europe were the outcome 
of a complex interaction between historically defined social cleavages and particular 
patterns of institutional development… European political parties acquired a virtually 
independent momentum, consolidating a set of political terms of reference which seems 
almost as immutable as the very languages in which they were expressed (Mair, 1983, 
p. 405). 
This ‘freezing’ phenomenon meant – and still means to a considerable extent – that 
Western European party-political systems were dominated by an oligopoly – Christian 
Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Communists – that was of declining 
relevance to the real cleavages, to the extent that they existed, in Western European countries’ 
societies. Of course, there have been plenty of new arrivals – the Greens and various 
Eurosceptical and further right parties in particular – but it is perhaps surprising how much the 
Union’s party politics, at EU level, is still dominated by an oligopoly that, at member state 
level, corresponded to the classic cleavages of the 1920s.15 The last section of this paper will 
briefly consider other possible future cleavages.  
What, also, of alternation? Most democratic systems are based on the logic that the 
electorate should, at some stage, be able to ‘throw the rascals out’, although there doesn’t need 
to be an intention of reproach or of punishment for an electorate to opt for change. Some 
European party systems (for example, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark) are used to the 
permanence of coalition governments, but there is an understanding that the composition of the 
coalitions may change – the ‘rascals’ may not be out altogether, in other words, but there will 
be change – alternation – of a sort. Other systems – Germany, Austria – seem comfortable with 
rule by ‘grand coalitions’, but such arrangements are regarded as being time bound and may 
                                                          
15 Writing in 1979, Marquand flatly declared: “The Community’s embryonic party system is an artificial construct, 
which reflects national rather than Community realities: (1979, p. 124). However, Hix points out that “the historical 
evidence is that political parties mainly form INSIDE rather than OUTSIDE parliaments – by elites breaking away 
from other parties, rather than by voters spontaneously starting a new movement. This is relevant for the European 
party system, as it suggests that at some point in the future ‘new’ parties/party formulations could form if a 
‘European party system’ was truly independent from national parties. For example, could a ‘European progressive 
alliance’ of MEPs, EP Groups, and national party leaders, emerge to agree a common candidate for the 
Commission President. Now that really would be a truly European party system” (11 July 2017 correspondence 
with the author). 
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collapse (Austria currently being a good case in point) so that, once again, change – alternation 
– is possible. National systems may throw up centrist movements or parties or coalitions of 
parties. Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ was a good example of a party that had captured the 
electoral centre ground. Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche! movement, now converted into a 
party of sorts, provides a more recent example. But where centrist governance is structural, then 
there can be no real alternation.16 Thus, whilst the following reasoning makes sense from a 
punctual, transitional point of view (the word ‘unique’ is important), such an arrangement 
would be democratically unhealthy17 in the longer run if it were to deny the European electorate 
the possibility to insist on change: 
The newly elected President of the European Commission represents the political 
centre: the political centre which exists in the current European Parliament and the 
political centre which exists in the European Council as well. I would not go as far as 
to say that Juncker is situated left of the EPP and right of the social-democrats, because 
if you try finding such a territory you might not succeed. But it may be fair to say that 
Juncker might be on the left of the EPP or on the right of the social-democrats. To me, 
he is exactly occupying this kind of political space which allows him to bring the 
different political forces of the Parliament together… This means that he is well placed 
at the centre of the system and has a unique chance to work as a unifier. And this would 
not have been the case had he just come from one winning party and thus being the 
representative of only one political wing of the European political spectrum (Welle, 
2014a). 
Lastly, and linked to the importance of alternation, the existence of viable opposition 
within the system is as important as the possibility for viable governance. Peter Mair has written 
persuasively on this subject (2007, 2013). As Albert Hirschman had pointed out in the 1970s, 
in the absence of any possibility for “voice”, the only alternative is “exit” from the system 
altogether (Hirschman, 1970). Luuk Van Middelaar has been a more recent proponent of the 
same argument (2017). If Euro-scepticism as a viable force is somehow not permitted within 
the system, then it risks being transformed into anti-Europeanism (or anti-EU-ism, at least).  
                                                          
16 However, whilst space precludes a proper treatment here, it should be pointed out, at least in passing, that some 
authors argue that the Swiss model of non-alternation (so nobody can be thrown out) might be more relevant to 
the EU (see, for example, Van Parijs, 2015 and 2017). Richard Corbett has argued: “The Commission would 
appear to be edging towards a hybrid of Swiss-style collegiality in its overall composition, but with a more 
majoritarian approach to designating its President” (in Kenealy, Peterson and Corbett, 2012). 
17 Sartori, among others, pointed a warning finger to the unhappy fates of the French Fourth Republic and Weimar 
Germany (Hanning, 1984, p. 437). 
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These ‘basic questions,’ as they have here been termed, require careful reflection and 
deliberation as the embryonic European parliamentary party-political system starts to emerge. 
In short, we cannot be certain that parliamentary party-political democracy is the most enduring 
of systems nor necessarily the most appropriate system for the future European Union (what 
can we know about future political developments, particularly as technology is evolving so 
rapidly?). But it is what the Union has, cumulatively, opted for. 18 The challenge will be to 
ensure that it functions sufficiently well to ensure not only good governance but also good 
opposition; not only stability but also alternation; not only aggregation, but also relevance. 
Rising to that challenge requires, in turn, careful reflection on the implications and 
consequences of each step on the way. In particular, the strategic long-term objective of good 
and viable governance and opposition should not be inadvertently prejudiced by short-term 
tactical considerations. This will perhaps particularly apply to the European Parliament’s 
current reflections on a common electoral system. As Sartori recalled, electoral reform is as 
much about the effects of parties on electoral systems as the other way around (1983) or, as 
Hanning more baldly put it, “it would be fruitless to estimate the effects of the new electoral 
system without reference to the reasons for its introduction” (1984, p. 434). 
 
6. Party political systems and some of their discontents 
Giovanni Sartori was one of a number of Italian political scientists who could see plainly, from 
the way Italy’s democracy functioned in the 1960s and 1970s, that party political systems of 
themselves did not guarantee effective governance or legitimacy. Some of the discontents that 
he and his contemporaries identified are potentially of relevance to a future European Union 
party political system and are here considered briefly.  
                                                          
18 Although it might be, to echo Churchill’s famous dictum, the worst form of government except for all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time. 
21 
 
A first concerns the phenomenon of bipartismo imperfetto, a term coined by Giorgio 
Galli (1967). Galli’s theory was later dismissed for being nostalgic about a system (a two-party 
system with regular alternation) which, with the exception of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, didn’t really exist – at least, not at that time (see, for example, Sassoon, 2013). 
However, part of Galli’s analysis concerned the situation in which a large party, the Communist 
Party (PCI), was excluded from governance, and the effects that this had on the balance of the 
overall system and its legitimacy and governability. Could a future Union party political system 
contain a large party that, for one reason or another, might be considered beyond the pale? What 
would happen if such a party were to win a majority in European elections? 
A second, related phenomenon is that of a so-called dominant party system (Sartori 
1976). This could best be defined as a system in which one political party predominates, has 
won successive elections, and seems unlikely to lose any elections for the foreseeable future. 
The phenomenon, and its risks, had already been identified by Maurice Duverger in the 1950s, 
with Sartori later considering the Italian case in particular (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976). 
Contemporary examples of dominant party systems would include Sweden (the Social 
Democrats), Japan (the Liberal Democrats) and India (the India National Congress). In the 
sophisticated case of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, the pseudo roles of government 
and opposition came to be carried out by factions (so-called correnti) within the party (Jacobs, 
1989, p. 178) and these, to a considerable extent, gave centre voters at least the illusion of 
alternation. A critical case concerns South Africa and the African National Congress Party 
(ANC), which has never scored less than 62% in the five national assembly elections to date 
and where there seems little probability that it will be out of power in the near future (see 
Suttner, 2006, and particularly his dismissal of the party dominance theory). Could a future 
Union party political system contain a predominant party or coalition of like-minded parties 
that would deny the perception of alternation?  
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A third, and again related phenomenon, is that of polarised pluralism, a term coined by 
Sartori.  This can perhaps best be understood as a bimodal distribution of support where a 
relatively empty centre ground is flanked by two ‘peaks’ of support for relative extremes. Pre-
1933 Germany provided a good example of this phenomenon, with strong support for the 
Communists on the left and the national socialists on the right. In the case of Italy in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the situation was further complicated by the fact that the Communist Party (PCI) 
could not accede to power and even after the 1973 compromesso storico was limited to state 
positions, but not political power. In Italy, the central vacuum was gradually filled in by the 
Socialist (PSI), Liberal (PLI) and Radical (PRI) Parties, but the existence of such polarized 
pluralism created severe governance challenges, leaving the country never far from an 
existential challenge. Also of potential relevance in Sartori’s various analyses are the presence 
of anti-system parties (how does a system cope with its potential nemesis?), bilateral 
oppositions (a dominant party astride the centre ground condemned to remain dominant because 
of extreme parties to its left and right)19 and irresponsible oppositions – parties that were not 
interested in governing, but only in bringing about change.  Again, could a future Union system 
throw up a similar situation and similar challenges (some would argue that it already has done)? 
 
7. A possible precedent and a pointer 
Can other countries and continents tell us anything about how the European Union’s 
parliamentary party-political system might evolve? The most obvious historical examples (and 
perhaps the only directly comparable ones) are those of the American First and Second Party 
Systems. These were the systems Marquand had in mind, both descriptively and also 
normatively, when he considered the consequences of the first direct elections in 1979. Facile 
                                                          
19 A propos, as Pierpaolo Settembri has pointed out, “A possible long-term scenario is one where ‘opposition 
parties’ command, if not a single majority, at least several blocking minorities in the European Parliament, thus 
preventing the formation and the operation of a grand coalition. …” (5 June 2017 correspondence with the author). 
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comparisons should be avoided, of course, but the object of the exercise is simply to look for 
possible pointers. Marquand argued that analogies with existing state systems in EU member 
states were misleading. Rather, the right analogy was with United States party politics in the 
1830s and 1840s. Then, the American Whigs and Democrats were  
loose coalitions of state parties, which usually operated at the state level, but which 
came together once every four years to contest presidential elections. They were held 
together, to the extent that they were held together at all, by their views on federal 
questions. Their views on state questions were often not merely different, but opposed 
(Marquand, 1979, p. 125). 
Though Marquand acknowledged that the American analogy could not be pushed too 
far, he insisted that it was a useful backdrop. Seen against it,  
The divisions within the nationalist and supra-nationalist camps in present-day Europe 
are neither particularly surprising nor particularly deep: If they come into being they 
will be coalitions of national parties. They will be divided at the national level though 
united at the Community level: so were their American counterparts in the days of 
Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. The Members returned under their banners, if 
and when they contest elections in their own right, will not always vote on party lines: 
nor did American Whig and Democratic Congressmen in the 1830s and 1840s. 
Sometimes, they will vote on national lines instead: in exactly the same way, American 
Whig and Democratic Congressmen often voted on state lines (Marquand, 1979, p. 
126). 
What the early American experience seems to indicate is that federal parties and party 
systems evolve out of loose coalitions between parties that may compete at state level, and that 
those parties tend to coalesce around the twin binary issues of more-or-less central government 
and more-or-less central budget. What Europeans would consider as traditional ideologies, on 
the left-right scale, are less salient at federal level than at state level in the US. The big 
difference is that state-based parties in the US did not evolve along left-right lines and didn’t 
evolve out of socio-economic adjustments to industrialisation and class, and in Europe there 
was no general division over slavery and no civil war. Notwithstanding these differences, 
Fabbrini’s seminal study has demonstrated how European Union-level politics:  
Has become constantly characterized by sectional rather than class or religious 
cleavages. Certainly, within the EP, traditional divisions are apparent, such as the 
division between the left … and the right … However, the structural division in the EP, 
as well as within the … Council of Ministers, is not between left and right (Fabbrini, 
2007, p. 137). 
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In becoming more sectoral, and in becoming increasingly about whether there should 
be ‘more’ or ‘less’ Europe, EU-level politics is becoming more like American politics, despite 
those very different beginnings.  
There may be other pointers closer to today including, elements from the 2016 United 
Kingdom referendum debate. During the referendum campaign, voice was also given to what 
might be termed enlightened left-wing critiques of the European Union and arguments therefore 
in favour of leaving the Union. Such arguments strongly echoed left-wing critiques of the 
European integration process voiced in the early 1950s and 1960s. For example:  
We voted Leave because we believe it is essential to preserve the two things we value 
most: a democratic political system and a social-democratic society. We fear that the 
European Union’s authoritarian project of neoliberal integration is a breeding ground 
for the far right. By sealing off so much policy, including the imposition of long-term 
austerity measures and mass immigration, from the democratic process, the union has 
broken the contract between mainstream national politicians and their voters. This has 
opened the door to right-wing populists who claim to represent ‘the people’, already 
angry at austerity, against the immigrant (Johnson, 2017). 
This enlightened left-wing case frequently refers back to Friedrich Hayek’s argument in 
favour of ‘inter-state federalism’ as a way of weakening nation-states’ interference in the 
workings of the free market (Hayek, 1939). To favour federalism (meaning European 
integration) is therefore to fall into the Hayekian trap. This critique goes on to argue that the 
only defence against the sort of ‘neo-liberal integration’ referred to above is by maintaining 
strong nation states, which is where the true demos is to be found (on this point, as Philippe van 
Parijs has illustrated, this brand of the left and Margaret Thatcher would make common cause 
– van Parijs, 2016). Thus  
Democracy needs a demos, a people for whom government is of, by and for. Without 
one, all you have is inter-elite management, treaty law and money grubbing. But how 
will ‘the people’ be constructed? Politics will decide. A left populism will not seek to 
define the people as the far right does, in opposition to the immigrant other, but in 
opposition to those powerful neoliberal elites that are no longer able, as Professor 
Streeck says, ‘to build a social framework around the hot core of capitalist profit 
making’ (Ibid.) 
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Leaving aside the recent work on ‘demoicracy’ (that is, the writings of those who argue 
that there is no need for a single demos), there would appear to be two logical weak points in 
such argumentation. The first is that the existence of strong nation states does not by itself 
guarantee left-wing government nor defend against neo-liberalism at the nation state level. The 
second, of more relevance to this analysis, is that a cooperative inter-relationship between 
nation states involving inter-governmental, confederal and federal elements need not 
necessarily result in a dominantly neo-liberal policy mix. Indeed, there is a strong prescriptive 
left-wing case arguing precisely the opposite. To take Van Parijs again:  
But if the utopian project we need is to have any chance of being realized, it will have 
to protect itself against the pressure of globalization… Above all, it will need to 
strengthen its federal institutions and develop the EU-wide demos required to make 
them work (Van Parijs, 2016, p. 7).  
In other words, Van Parijs argues, the answer is not less integration, but more.  
At the least, proponents of both the left-wing and the right-wing cases are to be found 
on both sides of the European integration process. Put another way, cogent cases can be made 
both for and against European integration on both the left and the right. Hayekian capitalists 
might argue in favour of integration because it weakens the interfering state. The reformist 
Labour Party of the late 1980s came to accept European integration as the best defence against 
the policies of a Hayek-inspired Conservative government within a Member State. If there were 
only nation states, Labour and Conservative supporters would happily exist on opposing sides 
of the political divide. But pro-European Labour and pro-European Conservatives find 
themselves together, no matter how uncomfortably, on the same side of the political divide at 
pan-EU level (a divide that will surely continue even after Brexit has occurred). The process is 
even more evident when anti-integration parties arise outside the mainstream parties, whether 
on the left or the right, since they push the pro-European parties (Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats, Socialists and Republicans) into political space where they broadly agree. 
It is surely one of the reasons why it so hard for the mainstream parties to find distinctive 
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political stances on EU issues in the European elections and also the reason why in such contests 
they tend to fall back on domestic politics, where the distinctions between them are clearer and 
more legible to the electorate. Pace Reif et al (1984, 1985), that is also the reason why European 
elections tend to be second-order national elections.  
If we look, as it were, through the other end of the telescope, at the emerging 
consequences of globalisation, then other trends would also appear to be increasingly salient. 
Marchetti (2016, especially pp. 154-158), for example, considers the possibility of a new 
political cleavage, more appropriate to a globalised world, of globalism versus localism. 
Beyond the arguably stale notions of left and right, this new division would  
Take us into the framing debates of neo-liberalism (is free trade a good thing? are 
international markets?), cosmopolitanism (aren’t we all globe-trotters now, even if we 
never leave our sitting rooms and computer screens?), localism (the world of ‘traditional 
values’ and the menace of ‘the other’); and – ugly term – civilisationism (are we all 
advancing with the onward progress of civilization together, or are there rather ‘clashes’ 
between different civilisations?) (Westlake, 2017, p. 2). 
It is perhaps to this emerging alternative political cleavage that Welle looks when he 
argues: 
There is also a conflict between a more national and a more internationalist viewpoint. 
Based on this traditional conflict in the political arena, I think that what we are seeing 
for the moment is that this quarter of the political matrix, which is defined by a 
combination of social and national viewpoints, this quarter is for the moment the growth 
market for political parties. We have a surge of political parties which can be described 
as ‘social nationalist’. We have in France Mme. Le Pen. We have Mr. Wilders in the 
Netherlands. We have a major party in Denmark. We have the AfD party in Germany. 
And we have Mr. Trump in the United States. For me, all of them build on a strong need 
for protection. They are ‘social’ in the sense that these parties put a very strong stress 
on protection. Protection is also interpreted by them in the nationalist sense of the word 
as a protection against international or internationalist influence. So this is a movement 
which is directed against liberalisation, against Europeanisation and against 
globalisation. At the same time ‘identity politics’ is back (Welle, 2016). 
So far, the traditional state-based systems have reproduced themselves at EU and European 
level, where they exercise oligopolistic powers. But some similarities with the US experience 
would nevertheless seem to be emerging, including the emergence of loose coalitions of parties 
for and against greater central government and greater central budgets. Indeed, perhaps the most 
obvious precedent is the Union itself. For what, it might be asked, was the so-called ‘technical 
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agreement’ in the European Parliament, and what is the current EPP-S&D pro-Juncker 
Commission coalition now, if not a ‘loose coalition’ – at times, even an electoral coalition? Are 
we not witnessing Marquand’s prediction gradually becoming a reality? It is neither quick nor 
tidy, but maybe, just maybe, Europe’s pro-integration parties – whatever their ideological 
divides in the domestic political context – are increasingly engaging in loose political coalitions 
at the EU level.20 The questions then arise (if we believe in the democratic healthiness of 
alternation of parties in power and of strong opposition as well as government): what faces 
them, or what should face them? 
 
8. Conclusion: a parliamentary party-based democracy - but what sort? 
The citizens of today’s European Union surely want their children, and their children’s children, 
to live in a democratic Union. But as the Union continues to evolve, and as the integration 
process seems likely to continue, it is surely increasingly important also to go beyond that 
simple (and perhaps simplistic) assertion and ask, ‘what sort of a parliamentary party-based 
democracy?’ As I have argued elsewhere, commentators and analysts of the European Union 
tend to oversee the long term ‘wood’ (in terms of trends and their consequences) in favour of 
the ‘trees’ (punctual events, such as Treaty change and the European elections themselves) 
(Westlake, 2017, p. 37). The Union will always remain a sui generis organisation, as much a 
process as a fixed end state, but by opting for the Spitzenkandidaten/lead candidate procedure 
in May-July 2014 (and assuming the procedure occurs again in 2019), the European Union has 
taken a decisive step in a particular direction – namely, towards a parliamentary, party-based 
democracy. Towards exactly what sort of parliamentary, party-based democracy, though, is still 
                                                          
20 Note that already “There is growing evidence of a shift in the critical political cleavage at national level in 
Europe, from left-right to pro-globalisation vs anti-globalisation. This has been accompanied by a shift in the 
socio-demographic basis of party choice from social class to age and education. I would expect this to be gradually 
replicated at EU parliamentary level, although it will not always align itself with the further integration vs no 
further integration division” (18 June 2017 correspondence with Sir Ivor Crewe). 
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not yet clear, but it surely does no harm to start wondering. It is in any case as well to be aware 
that the existence of a parliament and of political parties and, now, of an executive-legislature 
electoral link guarantees neither a functioning democracy nor an effective party-political 
parliamentary system. 
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